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Jeopardizing "Their Communities, Their
Safety, and Their Lives": Forced Concealed
Carry Reciprocity's Threat to Federalism
by HANNAH E. SHEARER*

Introduction
In December 2017, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the
Concealed Carry Reciprocity Act (H.R. 38),1 a National Rifle Associationbacked bill that would require each state to recognize and enforce the
concealed carry laws of every other state. The carrying of concealed
firearms in public is governed almost entirely by state law, and the laws of
the fifty states and the District of Columbia vary widely. Some states allow
their residents to carry concealed weapons on public streets only after police
conduct a background check and the applicant completes a safety training
course. Other states' laws are far weaker, including twelve states that do not
require any type of permit or background check before someone may freely
carry a hidden, loaded gun in public. H.R. 38 would force states with strong
laws to allow visitors from states with weak or nonexistent standards to carry
concealed firearms within their borders-potentially allowing many more
irresponsible, violent, or untrained people to do so. Worse still, under H.R.
38, individuals in states with strong laws could obtain permits from other
states with weaker standards, and then use those permits to carry in their
home states-even if they were ineligible to get a permit under their home
states' laws.
As Part I of this Essay explains, H.R. 38 lays out an exceedingly
dangerous policy. But aside from its substance, the bill is troubling because
of its implications for our federalist system of government. H.R. 38 will

* Staff Attorney and Second Amendment Litigation Director, Giffords Law Center to
Prevent Gun Violence. J.D., Stanford Law School, 2012; B.A., magna curn laude, Yale University,
2009. The author is grateful to Adam Skaggs for his comments and suggestions, and to Hae-in Lim
for editing assistance.
1. Concealed Carry Reciprocity Act of 2017, H.R. 38, 115th Cong. (2017) (passed by
recorded House vote of 231 to 198).
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require states to expend substantial resources enforcing other states' laws,
including by training law enforcement officers on all fifty states' concealed
carry regulations, and developing new procedures to verify the validity of
out-of-state permits. By forcing states to bear the costs of enforcing laws
other than their own, H.R. 38 scrambles the division of federal and state
authority established in the Constitution. Part II of this Essay argues that
H.R. 38 violates core principles of federalism-and therefore exceeds
Congress's Commerce Clause power-because it conscripts state officers
into enforcing other states' laws at the command of the federal government
and diminishes the accountability of elected officials to voters.
While the bill's text claims the Commerce Clause as its source of
Congressional authority, H.R. 38's supporters have justified the measure
rhetorically under the Second Amendment.2 In Part III, this Essay explains
that the Second Amendment neither requires nor supports forced concealed
carry reciprocity. As nearly all courts to have considered this issue
recognize, the Second Amendment does not bestow an unfettered right to
carry concealed firearms in public, so it does not require states to enforce
other states' more permissive concealed carry laws in place of their own. In
fact, McDonald v. City of Chicago established that the Second Amendment
does not foreclose "[s]tate and local experimentation with reasonable
firearms regulations," like the state laws requiring training and background
checks which H.R. 38 would override.3 This Essay concludes that forced
reciprocity is a dangerous policy not only because it puts the public at greater
risk of gun violence, but also because it unacceptably undermines political
accountability and state autonomy.

I.

Primer on the Concealed Carry Reciprocity Act

On December 6, 2017, the House of Representatives passed the
Concealed Carry Reciprocity Act (H.R. 38). The bill would require each
state to recognize and enforce the laws of every other state governing the
concealed carry of firearms.4 The National Rifle Association and other

2. E.g., Press Release, House Judiciary Committee Chairman Bob Goodlatte, Goodlatte
Statement at Markup of the Concealed Carry Reciprocity Act (Nov. 29, 2017), https://judic
iary.house.gov/press-release/goodlatte-statement-markup-concealed-carry-reciprocity-act/
(chairman's remarks on H.R. 38 opened with text from the Second Amendment).

3.

McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 784-85 (2010).

4.
The bill provides: "Notwithstanding any provision of the law of any State or political
subdivision thereof . .
and subject only to the requirements of this section, a person who is not
prohibited by Federal law from possessing, transporting, shipping, or receiving a firearm, who is
carrying a valid identification document containing a photograph of the person, and who is carrying
a valid license or permit which is issued pursuant to the law of a State and which permits the person
to carry a concealed firearm or is entitled to carry a concealed firearm in the State in which the
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supporters claim that reciprocity is necessary to establish an "interstate carry
regime" and ensure that people can travel with firearms. Actually, H.R. 38
creates no substantive regime for carrying or traveling with guns. The
proposal instead requires all states to enforce other states' laws authorizing
people to carry concealed firearms, regardless of the substance of the other
states' laws.6 Since weaker state laws let more people carry with fewer
background checks or other restrictions, the proposal effectively extends the
geographic scope of the weakest concealed carry laws in the nation. But the
bill does so without establishing any national criteria or standards for
carrying concealed firearms, and without paying for the enforcement of a
national concealed carry law.
State concealed carry laws vary widely in how effectively they screen
out untrained, reckless, or violent gun carriers. Some states, like California,
require training and a thorough evaluation by local police before one can get
a permit to carry concealed firearms within the state. As a result, fewer
people carry loaded, hidden guns on California's streets,8 and violent crime
rates have declined to a greater extent than in states with weaker laws. 9

person resides, may possess or carry a concealed handgun (other than a machinegun or destructive
device) that has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce, in any State that(1) has a statute under which residents of the State may apply for a license or permit to carry a
concealed firearm; or (2) does not prohibit the carrying of concealed firearms by residents of the
State for lawful purposes." Concealed Carry Reciprocity Act of 2017, H.R. 38, 115th Cong. §

926D(a) (2017).
5. E.g., Nat'l Rifle Ass'n Inst. For Legis. Action, Cornyn Introduces the "Constitutional
Concealed Carry Reciprocity Act of 2017" in the Senate (Mar. 3, 2017), https://www.nraila.org/
articles/20170303/cornyn-introduces-the-constitutional-concealed-carry-reciprocity-act-of-2017in-the-senate (discussing reciprocity bill similar to H.R. 38).
6. H.R. 38 applies to states if they either issue concealed carry permits or authorize residents
to carry concealed firearms without a permit. See H.R. 38 § 926D(a). Since all fifty states and the
District of Columbia fall into one or the other category, the legislation applies to all states and the
District. See Giffords Law Ctr. to Prevent Gun Violence, Concealed Carry, http://lawcenter.gifford
s.org/gun-laws/policy-areas/guns-in-public/concealed-carry/#state
[hereafter Concealed Carry]

(last visited Dec. 22, 2017).
7.
Giffords Law Ctr. to Prevent Gun Violence, Concealed Weapons Permitting in
California, http://lawcenter.gifford s.org/concealed-weapons-permitting-in-californial (last visited

Jan. 2, 2018).
8.
California has issued about 80,000 concealed carry permits for its 39.2 million residents.
Hudson Sangree & Phillip Reese, Concealed Gun Permits Soar in Sacramento County, SAC. BEE,
Apr. 23, 2016, http://www.sacbee.com/news/local/article73538112.html. By way of comparison,
Florida (a state with just over half of California's population) has issued over 1.8 million concealed
carry permits. Fla. Dep't of Agric. and Consumer Servs., Number of Licensees by Type as of
November 30, 2017, http://www.freshfromflorida.com/content/download/7471/118627/NumberofLicenseesByType.pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 2018) (1,824,127 concealed weapon licenses have
been issued in Florida).
9.
California's gun death rate decreased by 56% between 1993 and 2015-more than double
the national decline. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, FATAL INJURY DATA, from
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Strong laws like California's, which give local law enforcement the
discretion to deny concealed carry permit applications, have also been shown
to reduce illegal gun trafficking between states. 10
Other states have much lower standards: They do not give police any
discretion to deny permits once minimum criteria are met, and they issue
concealed carry permits to nonresidents, people who have never trained at a
gun range, and even people with criminal records. Investigations of some of
these states' permitting laws have uncovered serious flaws, including
thousands of permits that were intentionally or accidentally issued to violent
criminal offenders, or people who are dangerously mentally unstable. In just
the first six months of 2006, an investigation revealed that Florida authorities
issued more than 1,400 concealed carry permits to people with criminal
records." That investigation uncovered a case in which a man received a
Florida concealed carry permit after he pled guilty to shooting his girlfriend
in the head. 12 The state of Indiana has issued hundreds of permits to people
convicted of domestic abuse, weapons crimes, and other offenses, and some
later used the gun they were licensed to carry to commit additional crimes. 13
Investigations revealed hundreds of similarly questionable decisions to issue
or fail to revoke permits in North Carolina, Tennessee, and Texas. 14 Twelve

WEB-BASED
INJURY
STATISTICS
QUERY
AND
REPORTING
SYSTEM
(WISQARS),
https://www.cdc.gov/injury/wisqars (last visited Sept. 12, 2017); see also NAT'L CTR. FOR HEALTH
STATS., STATS OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/pressroom/states/
california.htm (last visited Sept. 12, 2017) (California's gun death rate is 7.4 per 100,000, compared
to the national average of 10.2). Two recent studies have found a compelling link between lax
concealed carry laws and increased violent crime and homicide rates. John J. Donohue et al., Rightto-Carry Laws and Violent Crime: A ComprehensiveAssessment Using Panel Data and a StateLevel Synthetic ControlsAnalysis 2-3 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23510,
2017) (states with weaker concealed carry laws experienced a 13 percent to 15 percent increase in
violent crime after ten years, beyond what would have been expected without such laws); Michael
Siegel et al., Easiness of Legal Access to ConcealedFirearmPermits and Homicide Rates in the
United States, 107 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1923, 1923-24 (2017) (weaker concealed carry laws are
associated with higher rates of homicide).
10. MAYORS AGAINST ILLEGAL GUNS, TRACE THE GUNS: THE LINK BETWEEN GUN LAWS
AND INTERSTATE GUN TRAFFICKING 18-19 (2010), http://www.tracetheguns.org/report.pdf.
11.
See Megan O'Matz, In Florida, It's Easy to Get a License to Carry a Gun, S. FLA. SUNSENTINEL, Jan. 28, 2007, http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2007-01-28/news/MGUNS28
1_carr
y-a-gun-license-to-carry-concealed (the 1,400 included people convicted of "assaults, burglaries,
sexual battery, drug possession, child molestation-even homicide").

12.

Id.

13. Mark Alesia et al., Should These HoosiersHave Been Allowed to Carry a Gun in Public?,
INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Oct. 11, 2009 (Indiana investigation found hundreds of permits issued to
people with criminal records; "many of those people committed subsequent crimes, some with the
guns they were legally permitted to carry").

14.

Michael Luo, Guns in Publicand Out of Sight, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2011, http://www.

nytimes.com/2011/12/27/us/more-concealed-guns-and-some-are-in-the-wrong-hands.html

(North
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so-called "permitless carry" states do even less to screen out dangerous gun
carriers, because they do not require any permit whatsoever to carry
concealed guns in public.15
Under H.R. 38, states with strong laws, like California, would be forced
to allow residents of permitless carry states to carry their concealed guns in
California with no training requirements or background checks. 16 They
would also be required to recognize all valid concealed carry permits issued
by another state, including those that do little or nothing to restrict concealed
carry by untrained people or people who cannot pass a background check. 17
In some cases, this means states would have to recognize permits issued to
their own residents by another state that offers permits to nonresidents.18
Under H.R. 38, a resident of state X could obtain a permit from state Y and
then use it to carry in state X-even if the resident failed to qualify for a
permit under the laws of their home state X. Worst of all, states would have
to allow people to carry concealed guns under any of the above
circumstances even if the state's own laws would normally preclude that
person from carrying-or even possessing-firearms.19
Though it purports to establish "reciprocity," the above examples show
that H.R. 38 does not have the same impact on all states: it disproportionately
burdens states with strong laws.
Under the proposal, states that
comprehensively regulate the concealed carry of firearms will be forced to

Carolina investigation found that about 200 concealed carry permittees were later convicted of
weapons offenses and 200 were convicted of felonies, including 10 who committed murder or
manslaughter; in about half of the convictions, authorities failed to revoke or suspend the permit,
even in cases of murder, rape, and kidnapping); Marc Perrusquia, Armed and Dangerous: Dozen
with Violent HistoriesReceived Handgun Carry Permits, MEMPHIS COMM. APPEAL, Mar. 12, 2009
(similar findings in Tennessee); William C. Rempel & Richard A. Serrano, Felons Get Concealed
Gun Licenses Under Bush's 'Tough' Gun Law, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2000, http://articles.
latimes.com/2000/oct/03/news/mn-30319 (similar findings in Texas).
15.
These states are Alaska, Arizona, Idaho, Kansas, Maine, Mississippi, Missouri, New
Hampshire, North Dakota, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wyoming. Concealed Carry, supra note 6.

16.
17.

H.R. 38
Id.

§ 926D(a).

18. See H.R. 38 § 926D(a) (allowing people to possess or carry concealed firearms in any state
if they are (1) "carrying a valid license or permit which is issued pursuant to the law of a State and
which permits the person to carry a concealed firearm" or if they are (2) "entitled to carry a concealed
firearm in the State in which the person resides" (as in a permitless carry state)). Since, with respect
to option (1), the bill does not specify that the valid permit must allow the person to carry a concealed
firearm in the state in which a person resides, this means a resident of one state could get a permit
from a second state and then use the second state's permit to carry in the first state.

19.

See H.R. 38

§ 926D(a),

(b) (reciprocity provisions apply to anyone "not prohibited by

Federal law from possessing, transporting, shipping, or receiving a firearm," and "shall not be
construed to supersede or limit" state laws restricting the carry of firearms in certain locations; there
is no analogous exception allowing states to still enforce state laws restricting who may carry or
possess firearms).
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allow carrying by many more out-of-state visitors and even some of their
own residents who would otherwise be disqualified from carrying concealed
weapons. Such states must allow someone to carry guns in accordance with
H.R. 38 even if they know that the carrier has exhibited signs of a dangerous
mental illness or engaged in a pattern of criminal behavior (but the person
was able to get a permit from a state that ignores such red flags). The
consequences are nowhere near as severe for states with weaker laws, or for
permitless carry states, which generally already allow anyone who may
possess a gun to carry it, even if they have a criminal record or other risk
factors for firearm misuse. Since these states have already accepted any
consequences of lax concealed carry laws, H.R. 38 would pose little
additional burden.2 0
In addition to undermining strong state concealed carry laws, H.R. 38
will impose considerable financial burdens on states. The bill requires states
to recognize all "valid" permits issued by other states, and bars police from
arresting or detaining anyone for carrying a firearm unless there is probable
cause that the person is violating H.R. 38.21 Taken together, these provisions
mean that whenever a police officer encounters a suspect with a gun who
claims a right to carry it under another state's laws, the officer must: (1)
determine whether the state the suspect claims to be from is a permitless
carry state, or (2) have some way of recognizing whether another state's
permit is "valid." All of this under the threat of a personal-capacity lawsuit
if the officer makes a mistake.22 The task of verifying the validity of a
concealed carry permit will be nowhere near as simple as checking a driver's
license during a traffic stop. Officers verifying a driver's license are able to
consult national databases, but no such database exists for concealed carry
permits, and H.R. 38 would not create one.23 Verifying the validity of
permits-as the text of H.R. 38 requires-is thus likely to be difficult and
resource-intensive, and could fundamentally change policing in
communities with high rates of gun carrying and violence.
In sum, H.R. 38 mandates a costly national "race to the bottom," in
which the weakest concealed carry laws supersede stronger state laws with

20. For Congress to single out states with strong carry laws for differential treatment in this
manner would violate principles of equal state sovereignty, see Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 2
(2013), in addition to running afoul of the other core principles of federalism discussed infra Part II.

21.

H.R. 38

§ 926D(a), (c).

22. H.R. 38 § 926D(d) (creating a cause of action against any person, state, or political
subdivision for anyone deprived of rights secured by H.R. 38).
23. Alex Yablon, The NRA Says Gun Permits Should Be Like Driver's Licenses. Here's
Where the ComparisonFalls Apart., TRACE, Dec. 7, 2017, https://www.thetrace.org/rounds/nraconcealed-carry-reciprocity-drivers-license/.
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respect to anyone who hails from or has a permit from a state with weaker
laws. Law enforcement groups and public health experts agree that H.R. 38
will put Americans at an even greater risk for gun violence.24 The bill could
empower irresponsible or dangerous people to subvert strong state laws by
shopping around for concealed carry permits from states with lax or
nonexistent standards. As domestic violence prevention advocates have
observed, the bill would make it easier for abusers to cross state lines with a
firearm in order to locate and intimidate former intimate partners.25 And
because states do not share records showing whether a concealed carry
permit is valid or has been revoked, the bill will make it far more difficult
for police to determine if a suspect visiting from another state is authorized
to carry a concealed weapon.26

II. Forced Reciprocity Violates Core Principles of Federalism
As discussed above, each of the fifty states and the District of Columbia
currently regulates the carrying of concealed firearms within their borders.
This is both because there are no generally applicable federal concealed carry
laws, and because gun regulation is within the traditional scope of states'
police powers. States have "great latitude" to use "police powers to legislate
as to the protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all

24.
See, e.g., Giffords, Concealed Carry Reciprocity, https://giffords.org/issue/concealedcarry-reciprocity/ (last visited Jan. 2, 2018) (collecting official law enforcement statements
opposing concealed carry reciprocity, including from the Major Cities Chiefs, International
Association of Chiefs of Police, state Attorneys General, and the National Law Enforcement
Partnership to Prevent Gun Violence); DANIEL W. WEBSTER ET AL., CONCEALED CARRY OF
FIREARMS: FACTS VS. FICTION 4 (2017), https://www.jhsph.edu/research/centers-and-institu
tes/johns-hopkins-center-for-gun-policy-and-research/publications/concealed-carry-of-firearms.pdf.
25. Letter from National Task Force to End Sexual and Domestic Violence to House
Judiciary Committee (Nov. 28, 2017), https://giffords.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/1 1I/NTF-CCR-

Letter- 11-28-2017.pdf.
26. See Yablon, supra note 23 (explaining that police would be unable to verify concealed
carry permits as they do drivers' licenses); see also Letter from 17 Attorneys General to
Congressional Leaders (Oct. 22, 2017) (on file with author) (forced reciprocity would endanger
police because "requiring officers to conduct traffic stops and other police activity with no ability
to authenticate every other State's carry laws would pose an extraordinary and unnecessary risk");
Press Release, Major Cities Chiefs, Major Cities Chiefs Denounce Combining Concealed Carry

Reciprocity with the Fix NICS Act (Dec. 4, 2017) (on file with author) ("The thousands of local
permit formats would make enforcement impossible, because police officers would not be able to
determine the validity of a permit issued in another State or locality.").

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

436

[Vol. 45:3

persons."27 Accordingly, courts have long recognized that states may use
their police powers to set standards for carrying firearms in public.28
H.R. 38 proposes to supplant state concealed carry laws with respect to
people with permits issued by another state and residents of permitless carry
states. H.R. 38's drafters and supporters have positioned it as an exercise of
Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce. 29 But whether the
Commerce Clause (or another enumerated power) authorizes H.R. 38
depends on whether the bill comports with the Tenth Amendment, which
imposes structural limits on the way Congress exercises its powers. 30 This
Essay argues that H.R. 38 violates these structural limitations-and so
exceeds Congress's legislative authority-in two major ways.
A. Forced Reciprocity Violates the Anti-Commandeering Doctrine
The Supreme Court's "anti-commandeering" cases have established
one structural limit on the manner in which Congress may exercise
legislative powers. These cases recognize that the Tenth Amendment bars
the federal government from compelling states to enact a law, or requiring
state officers to enforce a federal regulatory program. 31 The Court's anticommandeering decisions have struck down federal laws that compelled
state officers to take certain actions to enforce federal policy, or that required
states to pass specified regulations.

27.
Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 270 (2006) (internal quotations and citation omitted);
see also Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 247 (1976) ("promotion of safety of persons and property
is unquestionably at the core of the State's police power").

28.

E.g., People v. Seale, 274 Cal. App. 2d 107, 113 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969) ("It is a well-

recognized function of the legislature in the exercise of the police power to restrain dangerous
practices and to regulate the carrying and use of firearms and other weapons in the interest of the

public safety.").
29.
See H.R. 38 § 926D(a) (bill allows people to carry "a concealed handgun (other than a
machinegun or destructive device) that has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign
commerce"); see also David Kopel & Joseph Greenlee, Congress Should Use ConstitutionalPower
to Force States to Honor Gun Rights, THE HI,
Dec. 31, 2017, http://thehill.com/opinion/nationalsecurity/366896-congress-should-use-constitutional-power-to-force-states-to-honor ("the Reciprocity
Act is also supported by the same jurisdictional predicate as many other federal gun control laws:
namely, that the firearm in question was once sold or transported in interstate commerce").

30.

New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 159-60 (1992); U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The

powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.").
31. New York, 505 U.S. at 161 ("Congress may not simply 'commandee[r] the legislative
processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory
program."'); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) ("Congress cannot circumvent" the anticommandeering doctrine established in New York v. United States by "conscripting the State's
officers" to enforce a federal program without requiring states to enact legislation).
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H.R. 38 violates the anti-commandeering doctrine in two respects.
First, by directing states not to enforce their own concealed carry laws
against anyone with a "valid" concealed carry permit from another state,
H.R. 38 necessitates that state officials determine the validity of those
permits under other states' laws. Compelling states to enforce other states'
laws in this manner contradicts the Supreme Court's leading anticommandeering cases, New York v. United States and Printz v. United States.
Second, H.R. 38 will require states to expend resources overhauling their law
enforcement regulations, policies, and training procedures, an independent
example of unconstitutional commandeering.
1. New York and Printz
In New York v. United States, the Supreme Court invalidated a law that
required states either to accept ownership of radioactive waste generated by
private entities, or regulate the disposal of that waste.3 2 The Court explained
that the law's flaw was not its substance; regulating the waste disposal
market is "well within Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause."33
Rather, the constitutional flaw was the law's method of forcing states to act
in "service of federal regulatory purposes." 34 The Court explained that if "a
federal interest is sufficiently strong to cause Congress to legislate, it must
do so directly; it may not conscript state governments as its agents" and force
them to regulate.3 5 This remains true even if a federal law lets states choose
between different options for regulations they must adopt. Such a law still
improperly commandeers if it does not provide an option for states to
"decline to administer the federal program."36
The Court fleshed out this anti-commandeering principle in Printz v.
United States, a case challenging a provision of the Brady Handgun Violence
Prevention Act. The provision mandated that state law enforcement officers
help administer federal laws governing background checks on gun
purchases. State officers were required to "make a reasonable effort to
ascertain within 5 business days" whether a buyer could legally purchase a
handgun, including by researching and reviewing state and local records, and
taking other specified actions.37 The Court explained that in addition to
directly instructing state officials to take certain actions, the challenged

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

New York, 505 U.S. at 161.
Id. at 160.
Id. at 175.
Id. at 178; see also id. at 188.
Id. at 176-77.
Printz, 521 U.S. at 903.
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provision necessarily required states to craft discretionary policies, such as
"whether to devote maximum 'reasonable efforts' or minimum 'reasonable
efforts' to the background check research. 38 The Court struck down the
challenged provision under the Tenth Amendment, holding that Congress
cannot "conscript[] the State's officers" to enforce a federal background
checks program. 39
2. H.R. 38 ConscriptsState Officers into Enforcing a FederalProgramthat
Depends on Other States' Laws
Like the laws invalidated in New York and Printz, H.R. 38 would
directly conscript state officers into enforcing a federal regime-in this case,
a regime that incorporates other states' concealed carry laws. Currently,
each state decides whether to recognize permitless carry laws or concealed
carry permits from other states, and so decides if state officials must enforce
other states' laws. But under H.R. 38, whenever a police officer in one state
encounters somebody carrying a gun who claims to be authorized by a
different state, the officer must ignore the laws of his or her own state, and
instead apply the concealed carry laws of a different state. The officer would
be required to take these compelled actions, which are contrary to state law,
at the direction of federal legislation. And the officer would be doing so not
to comply with any substantive federal law, but to enforce a federal
regulatory program, the substantive content of which is established by
legislation passed in other states.
Forced reciprocity defenders might argue that, unlike in New York and
Printz, H.R. 38 does not actually force states or state officials to take action.
Instead, it empowers weapon carrierswho are authorized to carry concealed
firearms by one state to carry concealed firearms everywhere in the country.
In other words, the argument goes, all states must do is passively recognize
or not interfere with a new substantive right enjoyed by gun carriers, not take
any action on their own.
This argument fails to account for H.R. 38's text, which is framed not
just in terms of noninterference, but enforcement. It is certainly true that
H.R. 38's forced reciprocity provisions avoid obvious language of
compulsion that might make this an even easier case under Printz and New
York-it does not say, for example, "state officers must enforce other states'
concealed carry laws with respect to any person who is permitted to carry
firearms by another state." Nonetheless, H.R. 38 uses indirect language to
compel precisely the same outcome.

38.
39.

Printz, 521 U.S. at 928.
Id. at 935.
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Specifically, H.R. 38 authorizes people to carry concealed firearms in
any state if they have a "valid license or permit which is issued pursuant to
the law of a State and which permits the person to carry a concealed
firearm." 40 The bill also provides that presentation of "facially valid"
documentation must be treated (such as by state police officers) as "prima
facie evidence that the individual has a license or permit as required by this
section.
But H.R. 38 sets up no federal process or infrastructure for
validating permits issued by other states-it does not even define the term
"valid." By specifying that "valid" or "facially valid" permits allow gun carriers
to carry in any state, but providing no further guidance and establishing no
federal mechanism to determine validity, the bill necessitates that states
implement systems for their officers to determine the validity of concealed carry
permits. Indeed, because compliance with the terms of H.R. 38 depends on law
enforcement's ability to distinguish a valid permit from an invalid one, states
cannot enforce the terms of the legislation without expending the resources to
create systems or mechanisms for permit validation.
Requiring this state action to enforce other states' concealed carry laws
under a mandate imposed by federal legislation violates basic anticommandeering principles. H.R. 38 may phrase its directive passively, and
avoid overt language of compulsion, but it does not matter: The outcome is
exactly the same.
3. H.R. 38 ConscriptsStates into Adopting Costly Regulations
H.R. 38 also commandeers in a second, separate respect. As in Printz,
the legislation forces states to craft discretionary new policies and incur hefty
costs training state officers to enforce laws other than their own.42 The
legislation would impose myriad regulatory costs on states, including the
substantial expense of retraining police officers and establishing and
updating permit databases. Accordingly, the bill improperly "forc[es] state
governments to absorb the financial burden of implementing a federal
regulatory program."43
As detailed above, to comply with H.R. 38, states will need to educate
and train law enforcement officers on all fifty states' concealed carry laws,
as well as probable cause standards that would justify detaining someone for

40.
41.
42.
43.

H.R. 38 § 926D(a).
Id. § 926D(c).
See Printz, 521 U.S. at 928-30.
Id. at 930.
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unlawfully carrying a concealed weapon in violation of other states' laws.
States would also need to develop new procedures and systems to verify the
validity of out-of-state permits. Think of a state police officer who
encounters a suspect who claims he or she is authorized to carry a firearm by
another state. H.R. 38 would require that officer to determine whether the
state the suspect claims to be from is a permitless carry state, or whether a
proffered out-of-state permit is "valid" (or "facially valid").4 5 Since
concealed carry permit records are not currently shared among the states, 46
investigating a permit's validity will require new state laws and processes,
such as interstate record-sharing agreements. The costs of training police
officers, sharing records, and creating electronic verification systems could
be staggering, and would fundamentally alter the way police departments
treat armed suspects.
It makes no difference that the text of H.R. 38 does not specify the
specific regulations states or state officials must adopt to meet their
obligations under the legislation. As the Court explained in New York,
"latitude given to the States to implement Congress' plan" does not save a
law that unconstitutionally conscripts state officers.47 Here, states will have
the latitude to decide how they will comply with H.R. 38 by ensuring that
police do not arrest a visitor (or even in some cases, a resident) who is
carrying a gun in accordance with the laws of another state. But whatever
method they choose, states must implement Congress's regulatory plan by
enforcing a different set of gun laws against visitors from permitless carry
states or people with out-of-state permits. And under no circumstance may
states decline to apply the laws of other states and, instead, enforce only their
own laws and policies.48
It should also make no difference that some (though not all) of states'
regulatory costs might be avoidable because they have some latitude over
whether to incur them. In fact, this counterargument only highlights the
problematic way in which the legislation commandeers state action. This is
because states seeking to minimize the financial costs of enforcing H.R. 38
will be saddled with other burdens as a result of their compelled choice to
mitigate costs. For instance, a state that does not wish to expend resources

44.
See H.R. 38 § 926D(c) (the bill prohibits arresting or detaining anyone who possesses a
concealed firearm "unless there is probable cause to believe that the person is doing so" in violation
of the legislation).

§ 926D(a), (c).

45.

H.R. 38

46.

Yablon, supra note 23.

47.

New York, 505 U.S. at 176-77.

48. Id. (fact that a "State may not decline to administer the federal program" suggests it is
compulsory).
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establishing and maintaining a national database of concealed carry permits
might be able to set up a less comprehensive database more cheaply; a state
could even decide to abandon meaningful verification efforts by treating all
permits from other states as valid. But a state's choice to abandon
enforcement will be dangerous: It runs the serious risk that more people will
unlawfully carry firearms within the state, that violent crime will increase,
and that gun deaths and injuries will rise. It could also open states up to the
allegation that they are violating H.R. 38 and their obligation under the law
to assess permit validity. In other words, under H.R. 38, a state cannot
reduce enforcement expenses without incurring, at the very least, significant
reputational and public safety costs. The fact that states would be required
to choose between one type of cost or the other further demonstrates that the
bill unconstitutionally compels state action.
For all of the above reasons, H.R. 38 impermissibly commandeers states
into enforcing a federal program of reciprocity. The bill requires state
officers to enforce other states' laws by determining the validity of out-ofstate concealed carry permits. It also forces states to craft new law
enforcement policies, develop systems to verify permits, and bear other
enforcement
costs-precisely
the
features
characterizing
the
unconstitutional legislation in New York and Printz.
B. Forced Reciprocity Diminishes the Accountability of Elected Officials
The anti-commandeering doctrine is rooted in the Tenth Amendment's
structural limitations on Congressional power. It also arises in defense of a
core tenet of federalism: governments should be accountable to voters for
legislation they enact. The structure of H.R. 38 poses an unprecedented threat
to political accountability, putting some voters in a position where they have
no avenue to hold elected officials responsible for the concealed carry laws
applied in their states. The novel manner in which H.R. 38 would damage
political accountability poses a federalism problem of its own, and also
underscores that the legislation violates the anti-commandeering doctrine.
In New York, the Court observed that when Congress forces states to
regulate in a particular manner, accountability is undermined because "it
may be state officials who will bear the brunt of public disapproval, while
the federal officials who devised the regulatory program may remain
insulated from the electoral ramifications of their decision." 49 In Printz, the
Court reiterated that when states are forced to administer a federal program,
Congress "can take credit for 'solving' problems without having to ask their

49.

New York, 505 U.S. at 169.
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constituents to pay for the solutions with higher federal taxes."
In both
instances, accountability is diluted because commandeering can confuse voters.
While voters can theoretically hold at least their federal representatives (though
not other members of Congress) responsible for a compelled state policy, they
may not realize that federal policy is ultimately to blame.
Forced reciprocity's novel structure would create an even more serious
political accountability problem. As things currently stand, each state
legislature must answer to its voters for the concealed carry standards it
adopts. H.R. 38 strikes an unprecedented blow to accountability by allowing
not only the federal government, but also the legislatures of other states to
determine the concealed carry standards a given state must enforce. Under
H.R. 38, if one state's legislature amends its concealed carry laws, it will
directly affect law enforcement practices in the forty-nine other states. But
the other states' residents will be powerless to hold the first state's legislature
accountable for regulatory burdens or public safety threats arising from the
change. Suppose, for example, that Nevada enacts permitless carry while
forced reciprocity is in effect, and many more Nevadans start visiting
California with concealed weapons they previously could not have brought.
California voters will have no way to hold Nevada's legislature responsible
for enabling permitless carry, even though the decision directly harms
California in terms of increased policing costs and the possibility of
increased firearm violence.52
H.R. 38 does not simply diminish accountability in the manner
described in Printz and New York; it could eradicate it entirely. Once forced
reciprocity is in place, voters of one state will be completely unable to hold
another state's legislature accountable for legislation that directly affects
them because it is applied within their borders. Thus, even if voters correctly
understand which political entity is responsible for a policy outcome they
dislike, they cannot use their votes to hold another state's legislature
accountable.
The unprecedented way in which H.R. 38 diminishes
accountability is a structural federalism violation of its own, and further
evidences that the bill improperly commandeers state action.

50.

Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 930 (1997).

51.
See id. (observing that "even when the States are not forced to absorb the costs of
implementing a federal program, they are still put in the position of taking the blame for its
burdensomeness and for its defects").
52. Nevada's weaker gun laws have been shown to drive gun violence in California. See
Ellicott C. Matthay et al., In-State and Interstate Associations Between Gun Shows and Firearm
Deaths and Injuries, 167 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 837, 837 (2017), http://annals.org/aim/
fullarticle/2659346/state-interstate-associations-between-gun-shows-firearm-deaths-injuries-quasi
(finding that unregulated gun shows in Nevada are associated with increased firearm injuries in

California).
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III. The Second Amendment and Federalism
Supporters of H.R. 38 have defended the above consequences as
necessary to ensure that Americans enjoy Second Amendment rights while
traveling. Some have suggested that forced reciprocity is an appropriate use
of Congress's "Enforcement Power" under the Fourteenth Amendment to
correct supposed Second Amendment violations by states. 53 This argument
misapprehends both Second Amendment law and the effect of H.R. 38.
A. The Second Amendment Does Not Compel Reciprocity
In District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court ruled for the first

time that law-abiding, responsible people have a Second Amendment right
to keep an operable handgun in the home for self-defense. 4 The Court's
narrow ruling did not address whether Americans have a similar right to
carry guns on public streets. Heller also held that the Second Amendment is
"not unlimited," and illustrated this point by observing that "the majority of
the 19th-century courts to consider the question held that prohibitions on
carrying concealed weapons were lawful under the Second Amendment or
state analogues.
State concealed carry laws are now much more permissive than the
"prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons" these early courts upheld.
Today, all states allow public concealed carry to some extent, either with or
without a permit.56 Unsurprisingly, most courts to consider Second
Amendment challenges to these comparatively modest restrictions have
upheld them. Citing the fact that early American courts upheld total bans on
public concealed carry, two federal circuit courts have determined that the
Second Amendment does not protect public concealed carry, and that states
may regulate it however they choose. Four circuits have determined that
even assuming that the Second Amendment protects public concealed carry
to some degree, states have broad leeway to regulate it, including by
requiring that carriers get a permit or prove a heightened need for self-

53.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 ("The Congress
shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.").

54.
55.

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
Id. at 626.

56.

Concealed Carry, supra note 6.

57. Peruta v. Cty. of San Diego, 824 F.3d 919, 939 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc), cert. denied,
137 S. Ct. 1995 (2017); Peterson v. Martinez, 707 F.3d 1197, 1211 (10th Cir. 2013).
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protection. One circuit struck down a total ban on public concealed carry,
but later upheld strong concealed carry permitting laws that restrict permit
applications from nonresidents.59 The D.C. Circuit, an outlier, diverged from
all of these rulings and held that Washington, D.C. could not restrict concealed
carry permits to people with a "special need for self-defense." 60 But even the
D.C. Circuit did not suggest there is a constitutional right to carry concealed
weapons nationwide without a permit, training, or background check, as would
be compelled by H.R. 38's provisions regarding permitless carry states.61
These decisions suggest a near-consensus: The Second Amendment
allows states to comprehensively regulate concealed carry, including with
strong laws requiring that carriers obtain a permit and demonstrate their
qualifications to carry loaded, hidden firearms in public. If these decisions
are correct, the Second Amendment provides no constitutional basis for
Congress to override state concealed carry permitting laws. Even if the
above decisions are later overruled or courts depart from them, it remains
unlikely that H.R. 38 could be construed as "enforcing" the Second
Amendment. That is because the bill requires reciprocity, but does not set
any substantive concealed carry standards tied to the Second Amendment.
Instead, the bill requires recognition of other states' concealed carry laws
regardless of what the laws substantively require, and compels this outcome
regardless of the substance of the state law being superseded. This structure
means that H.R. 38 cannot be said to enforce the Second Amendment at all,
because it is neutral as to the substance of laws being applied. Absent an
actual Second Amendment standard being enforced, it appears that the bill's
ultimate aim is to make armed travel between states more convenient, rather
than to correct Second Amendment violations.

58. Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 882 (4th Cir. 2013); Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426,
431-35 (3d Cir. 2013); Kachalsky v. Cty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 94-96 (2d Cir. 2012);
Hightower v. Boston, 693 F.3d 61, 73-74 (1st Cir. 2012).
59. Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 940, 942 (7th Cir. 2012) (striking down public carry
prohibition); Culp v. Madigan, 840 F.3d 400, 401 (7th Cir. 2016) (affirming denial of preliminary
injunction in challenge to Illinois concealed carry permitting law that bars most out-of-state
residents from applying for a permit); Berron v. Ill. Concealed Carry Licensing Rev. Bd., 825 F.3d

843, 847-49 (7th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 843 (2017) (upholding challenged aspects of
Illinois' concealed carry permitting law and observing that there are "different degrees of danger
posed by possessing a weapon at home . . . and carrying a loaded weapon in public").

60.

See Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650, 667 (D.C. Cir. 2017).

61. The Wrenn court acknowledged that the Second Amendment right to concealed carry of
firearms belongs only to "responsible, law-abiding citizens." Id. at 663. This implies that states
may use background checks and permits to verify that someone is responsible and law-abiding.
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B. The Second Amendment Supports State Gun Regulation
Far from justifying H.R. 38, Second Amendment jurisprudence
supports the principles of federalism which forced reciprocity threatens. In
Heller, the Supreme Court held that the Constitution permits legislatures "a
variety of tools for combating [the] problem" of gun violence.6 2 In
McDonald, the Court recognized that while the Second Amendment forbids
certain state actions, like the handgun ban Heller invalidated, "[s]tate and
local experimentation with reasonable firearms regulations" will continue.63
The Second Amendment places "limits" on the states, Justice Alito wrote,
but "by no means eliminates" states' "ability to devise solutions to social
problems that suit local needs and values." 64
Since Heller and McDonald, federal courts have repeatedly recognized
the authority of state governments to adopt legislation mitigating the local
impact of gun violence. For instance, most federal circuit courts have
determined that reasonable gun regulations challenged under the Second
Amendment should be reviewed under intermediate constitutional scrutiny,
rather than the more exacting standard of strict scrutiny. This consensus is
nearly unanimous with respect to laws that do not prevent law-abiding,
responsible people from keeping an operable handgun in the home-the core
Second Amendment right recognized in Heller-or burden other closelyrelated or "core" rights.6 5 This includes four federal circuits that have
applied intermediate scrutiny to laws regulating the carrying of guns for selfdefense in public.66
The application of intermediate scrutiny reflects courts' recognition that
governments retain significant authority to regulate the dangerous effects of
firearms while observing constitutional limits. For example, the Tenth
Circuit explained its selection of intermediate scrutiny as follows:

62. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 636 (2008).
63. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 784-85 (2010).
64. Id. (emphasis in original).
65. See, e.g., Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 96; United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 97 (3d
Cir. 2010); United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 471 (4th Cir. 2011); Nat'l Rifle Ass'n v.
McCraw, 719 F.3d 338, 348 (5th Cir. 2013); Tyler v. Hillsdale Cty. Sheriff's Dep't, 837 F.3d 678,
692 (6th Cir. 2016) (en banc); United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1138 (9th Cir. 2013); United
States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792, 802 (10th Cir. 2010); Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244,
1252-53 (D.C. Cir. 2011); see also United States v. Booker, 644 F.3d 12, 25 (1st Cir. 2011)
(avoiding term "intermediate scrutiny," but requiring "a substantial relationship between the
restriction and an important governmental objective"); United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 642
(7th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (avoiding 'levels of scrutiny' quagmire" but upholding law since "[b]oth
logic and data establish a substantial relation" between law and important government objective).

66. Bonidy v. U.S. Postal Serv., 790 F.3d 1121, 1126 (10th Cir. 2015); Kachalsky, 701 F.3d
at 96-97; Woollard, 712 F.3d at 882; Drake, 724 F.3d at 443.
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The risk inherent in firearms and other weapons distinguishes the
Second Amendment right from other fundamental rights that have
been held to be evaluated under a strict scrutiny test, such as the right
to marry and the right to be free from viewpoint discrimination, which
can be exercised without creating a direct risk to others. Intermediate
scrutiny appropriately places the burden on the government to justify
its restrictions, while also giving governments considerable flexibility
to regulate gun safety. 67
Intermediate scrutiny also appropriately accounts for the fact that there
may be multiple valid legislative responses to gun violence.
Under
intermediate scrutiny, governments have leeway to select the gun policy that
suits their constituent communities and substantially furthers public safety,
even if opponents of that policy can point to other evidence supporting a
different type of regulation.68
Consistent with the embrace of intermediate scrutiny and the leeway it
affords different cities and states to adopt laws appropriate to their
circumstances, several federal appellate courts and individual judges have
relied more substantively on principles of federalism in Second Amendment
challenges. These courts and judges used federalism principles as a basis, in
part, to reject Second Amendment challenges to state and local gun
regulations that are stricter than other jurisdictions' laws, or which
challengers frame as a departure from national norms.
In Friedmanv. City of HighlandPark, a Seventh Circuit panel rejected
a Second Amendment challenge to a local ordinance prohibiting the
possession of assault weapons and large-capacity magazines. 69 The
challengers argued that the city cannot prohibit these powerful weapons and
accessories since they are "commonly owned for lawful purposes" by a
significant percentage of American gun owners.70 In Judge Easterbrook's
majority opinion, the panel declined to rely inflexibly on a "common use"

67.

Bonidy,790F.3dat 1126.

68.
See Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 99 (upholding New York law restricting the concealed carry
of firearms under intermediate scrutiny and noting that "[i]t is the legislature's job, not ours, to
weigh conflicting evidence and make policy judgments"); Wiese v. Becerra, No. 2:17-903-WBS,

2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101522, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Jun. 29,2017) (upholding law under intermediate
scrutiny and crediting state's interpretation of evidence, recognizing that "[r]easonable minds will
always differ" on how to "reduce the incidence and harm of mass shootings"); see also, e.g., Heller

v. District of Columbia, 801 F.3d 264, 272-73 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (under intermediate scrutiny,
District of Columbia need only show that it has "drawn reasonable inferences based on substantial
evidence"; if so, summary judgment for the District is appropriate even if there is conflicting
evidence on the record).

69. Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 784 F.3d 406 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct.
447 (2015).
70. See id. at 408-09.
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test, and suggested that because the Second Amendment authorizes "at least
some categorical limits on the kinds of weapons that can be possessed,"7 1
local governments may regulate even weaponry that many jurisdictions
allow.72 The panel concluded that "[w]ithin the limits established by the
Justices in Heller and McDonald, federalism and diversity still have a
claim"; the "Constitution establishes a federal republic where local
differences are cherished as elements of liberty, rather than eliminated in a
search for national uniformity." 73
Two Fourth Circuit judges cited a similar idea when the court, sitting
en banc, upheld a Maryland law restricting the possession of assault weapons
and large-capacity magazines. In his concurrence in Kolbe v. Hogan, Judge
Wilkinson (joined by Judge Wynn) explained that Heller did not change the
fact that "[p]roviding for the safety of citizens within their borders has long
been state government's most basic task." 74 In fact, "Heller was a cautiously
written opinion, which reserved specific subjects upon which legislatures
could still act." 7 5 Judge Wilkinson noted that while it is "fair" for opponents
to argue that an assault weapon ban is overly restrictive or will be ineffective,
such questions are quintessentially legislative judgments not for the courts
but "for the people of Maryland (and the Virginias and the Carolinas) to
decide." 76 The judges concluded that Maryland's challenged laws were
justified in light of the leeway Heller preserved for state legislatures, and
because: "It is their community, not ours. It is their safety, not ours. It is
their lives, not ours."7
Finally, in Hamilton v. Pallozzi, a unanimous Fourth Circuit panel
relied on principles of federalism to reject a Second Amendment challenge
to the application of disparate state firearm laws.7 8 The plaintiff in Hamilton
was a nonviolent felon who brought an as-applied Second Amendment
challenge in an attempt to restore his right to possess a firearm in the state of
Maryland. The plaintiff's felony convictions occurred in Virginia, and
Virginia's courts later restored his gun possession rights. But under the laws
of Maryland, where the plaintiff now lives, he is barred from possessing
firearms without a full pardon from Virginia's governor. 79 The Fourth Circuit

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

See Friedman, 784 F.3d at 410.
See id. at 408-09.
Id. at 412.
Kolbe v. Hogan, 849 F.3d 114, 150 (2017) (Wilkinson, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. at 151.
Id.
Hamilton v. Pallozzi, 848 F.3d 614 (4th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 199 L. Ed. 2d 384 (U.S. 2017).
Hamilton, 848 F.3d at 617-18.
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affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff's Second Amendment challenge and
upheld the Maryland felon-possession laws as applied to him. In doing so, the
court rejected the plaintiff's argument that it would be "absurd" to allow
Maryland to bar him from gun possession based on a Virginia conviction when
Virginia had fully restored his gun rights.80 The court observed that the
plaintiff's "absurdity" argument failed to consider "the impact of federalism":
In our federal system, each state is permitted to create its own laws so
long as they do not run afoul of the Constitution, federal laws, and
treaties, see U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2., specifically as relevant here, the
Second Amendment. Virginia may have opted to restore [plaintiff's]
gun ownership rights within its borders, but Maryland need not do so
within its own borders.81
The court noted that states may have "different reasons" "to permit a
person to be armed in certain contexts, and possibly not in others," and that
the differences are of no constitutional import unless one state is violating
"the strictures of the Second Amendment." 82 Different states may therefore
regulate firearms differently without creating an independent Second
Amendment problem-and indeed, such differences are an essential feature
of our federal system of government.
The principles identified in the above decisions bear directly on the
wisdom and constitutionality of H.R. 38. Absent any federal law setting
substantive standards for carrying concealed firearms, each of the fifty states
has provided for the safety of its residents with different firearm laws tailored
to their unique needs. To paraphrase Judge Wilkinson's concurrence in
Kolbe, the different states have acted to protect their communities, their
safety, and the lives of their people. Congress should not lightly attempt to
replace the reasoned determinations of individual states with a system in
which distant states can render all other states powerless to meaningfully
oversee who can carry loaded, concealed weapons on public streets.

Conclusion
Forced concealed carry reciprocity will place the public at risk of
increased violence and hinder efforts by police officers to identify and stop
unlawful gun carriers. But forced reciprocity is also a dangerous policy
because it threatens core tenets of federalism. Rather than directly regulating
states by setting substantive standards for concealed carry, H.R. 38 would

80.
8 1.
82.

Id. at 628.
Id.
Id.
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override states' reasoned decisions about what gun laws to enforce against
visitors from other states and even their own residents. By depriving states
of the choice whether or not to recognize a concealed carry permit or a
permitless carry law, the bill denies states the ability to ensure that people
carrying hidden, loaded guns within their borders meet the standards they
have found necessary to maintain public safety in light of their state's
culture, circumstances, and needs. In doing so, H.R. 38 threatens the
structural principles of federalism that protect states from being
commandeered by the federal government, and also improperly diminishes
the political accountability of elected officials.
The Second Amendment provides no support for forced reciprocity. In
fact, recent decisions have underscored the importance of protecting gun policies
that reflect varied community needs and preferences. When it comes to
firearms, the laws of the fifty states are diverse, mirroring regional differences
in culture, geography, and perceptions about public safety. It poses no Second
Amendment problem to let states adopt and enforce the concealed carry policies
they reasonably determine will mitigate the risks of gun violence-and protect
their communities, their safety, and their lives. It is the forced invalidation of
such policies that is a more serious constitutional concern.
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